

Ara Marjanyan

**“VIRTUAL” DEMOGRAPHICS
OF THE
AZERBAIJANI REPUBLIC**

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Marjanyan Ara
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The book reviews the statistical data related to demographics of the Azerbaijani Republic (AR). A comparative analysis of these data is performed relative to data from a number of reputable international sources. It is demonstrated that the AR government structures consistently misrepresent the migration flow patterns, mortality and fertility statistics, artificially adding 2.0-2.2 million to the population number of the AR. Since 1996-97 official Baku distorts the data on annual population growth and population distribution by sex. In line with the decades-long “traditions”, Baku continues to falsify the data on ethnic composition of the country’s population. It is shown that the Potential of Forced Assimilation for Azerbaijani SSR/AR in the period between 1939 and 1999 equals to 723,750, which can be characterized as an ethnocide carried out in Azerbaijani SSR/AR during almost the whole period of the country’s history. What causes concern is that the garbled statistics of Azerbaijan are in a way “validated” and promulgated by a number of international organizations.

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CONTENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.....	4
AUTHOR'S FOREWORD TO THE ENGLISH EDITION.....	5
PREFACE.....	6
Chapter 1	
POPULATION OF THE AZERBAIJANI REPUBLIC.....	9
Chapter 2	
MIGRATION.....	25
Chapter 3	
POPULATION GROWTH RATE.....	37
Chapter 4	
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY SEX.....	45
Chapter 5	
ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION.....	63
CONCLUSIONS.....	80
References and Literature.....	82
Annex 1	
Migrants and Remittances.....	86
Annex 2.	
Population Distribution by Sex in the Azerbaijani Republic.....	92
Annex 3.	
Population Growth Scenarios for the Azerbaijani Republic.....	94
Annex 4.	
Population Census Results of Azerbaijani SSR and Azerbaijani Republic: Total Population, Turkic/Azerbaijani and Some of the Other Ethnicities of the Republic's Population.....	95

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AR	Azerbaijani Republic
ASSC	Azerbaijani Republic State Statistical Committee
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NKR	Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
RF	Russian Federation
RoA	Republic of Armenia
RoG	Republic of Georgia
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
UN	United Nations Organization
UN DESA	UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UN DYB	UN Demographic Yearbook
UN PD	UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division
USCB	The United States Census Bureau
US CIA	The United States Central Intelligence Agency
WB	World Bank
WB DPG	World Bank Development Prospects Group

Author's Foreword to the English Edition

This book analyzes distortion of demographic statistics by official Baku, which is something reprehensible by itself. However, in these troubled times and in our unstable region, such activities implemented at the government policy level as an element of information and psychological warfare, lead to very dangerous repercussions. Therefore, it appears important to bring impartial information to as large audience as possible.

Preparation of the English edition of the book rendered such an opportunity, as well as gave a chance to somewhat expand its contents compared to the original edition. For example, additional material was presented in Chapter 4 related to a critical analysis of results of the population modeling/forecasting up to the year 2100 for South Caucasus countries performed by UN PD. In our view, the introduction of the Potential of Forced Assimilation concept and its assessment for Azerbaijani SSR/AR at the end of Chapter 5 is an important addition. The References and Literature section was somewhat expanded, new Annexes were added and some misprints/inaccuracies were corrected.

The sources for all the numbers used are indicated in the book. If unspecified, then either the previous source has been used or the author's calculations and estimates are presented. References and literature used can be found at the end of the book. ASSC¹ website and other online databases were first visited end of September 2011 and last checked for updates in December 2011. Otherwise, specially noted.

The author would like to take this opportunity to thank the staff of «Noravank» Foundation, whose professional and moral support made possible writing and publishing this book. Work done by G. Harutyunyan (Scientific Editor) and V. Odabashian (translator and editor of the English version) has to be especially noted, as their amendments and advices significantly contributed to enhancing the original edition of the book.

*A.M.
July, 2012*

¹ <http://www.azstat.org>

PREFACE

There are many studies and articles about the Azerbaijani Republic (AR) in our national publications and press¹. However, these are mainly focused on reviewing Azerbaijan's foreign policies, view the country from the perspective of the conflict with NKR, analyze the anti-Armenian propaganda machine of Azerbaijan and/or regard the country mostly in the context of the regional and global geopolitical processes. In some cases certain aspects of Azerbaijan's military potential are reviewed. Surprisingly, there are very few comprehensive writings about the overall socioeconomic system of the AR. In this regard it appears that among the analytical publications there is

¹ Since 2005 about 500 publications can be found in the Noravank Foundation's website (www.noravank.am) alone.

no analytical study, which would combine the benefits of an analytical study and a reference source. Meanwhile, such publications are absolutely necessary for understanding the real potential and development prospects of Azerbaijan.

This publication is aimed at filling this gap at least to some extent. The size of population and other demographic indicators of the official Baku statistics are reviewed herein. The problem is that the simple question “what is the population of Azerbaijan?” has no similarly simple answer. Moreover, this is one of the elements of the information warfare conducted by the AR authorities. Hence, it is cluttered with numerous misrepresentations and manipulations. Meanwhile, the demographic data are the basis of any country’s socioeconomic system and understanding the true situation is more than important.

This study is based on the official data of the AR State Statistical Committee (ASSC) compared to the relevant data on the AR demographics from a number of international organizations. Such approach is necessary, because the statistical demographic data on Azerbaijan have been consistently garbled since long ago by official Baku, whereas data from different international sources are often contradictory and mutually exclusive.

The comparative analysis conducted herein shows that the AR official sources consistently misrepresent migration flow patterns and birth/death statistics, artificially adding 2.0-2.2 million to the official population number of Azerbaijan. Since 1996-97, official Baku twists

data on annual population growth and composition by sex. Adhering to the decades-long “tradition”, official Baku continues to consistently misrepresent the data on the country’s ethnic composition. It is noteworthy that a number of international organizations in a way “validate” and promulgate the demographic statistics distorted by official Baku.

G. Harutyunyan
Scientific Editor
March, 2012

Chapter 1

POPULATION OF THE AZERBAIJANI REPUBLIC

According to the ASSC official data, the population of Azerbaijan constituted 9.11 million as of the beginning of 2011. The same figure is stated by the Interstate Statistical Committee of CIS¹. *Table 1* shows data on population numbers taken from the ASSC official website as of September 2011. As the source claims, these data area adjusted based on the April 2009 AR population census results.

¹ Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS <http://www.cisstat.com/>

Table 1: Official data on the Azerbaijani Republic's population					
Years	Population	Population growth		Births	Deaths
	in thousands	%	per 1000 of population		
2000	8,032.8	1.00%	8.8	14.7	5.9
2001	8,114.3	1.01%	8.1	13.7	5.6
2002	8,191.4	0.95%	8.0	13.7	5.7
2003	8,269.2	0.95%	7.9	13.9	6.0
2004	8,349.1	0.97%	9.9	15.9	6.0
2005	8,447.4	1.18%	10.7	16.9	6.2
2006	8,553.1	1.25%	11.3	17.5	6.2
2007	8,666.1	1.32%	11.5	17.7	6.2
2008	8,779.9	1.31%	11.4	17.4	6.0
2009	8,922.4	1.62%	11.3	17.2	5.9
2010	8,997.6	0.84%	12.5	18.5	6.0
2011	9,111.1	1.26%			

Source: <http://www.azstat.org/publications/azfigures/2011/en/004.shtml>

As seen in the Table above, official Baku claims that the population size of Azerbaijan in 2011 constituted 9.1 million, and the population growth over the last 11 years was at least 0.95%, except for 2010, when it dropped to 0.84% (below we shall return to this exception).

These data raise a number of questions. First, it has to be noted that official Baku does not distinguish between *de jure* and *de facto* populations as commonly accepted among almost all countries and international organizations, including the National Statistical Service of Armenia. Also, the presented official data significantly differ from those of other sources.

Generally, the available data on Azerbaijan’s population across different sources are very inconsistent. Even data from some reputable organizations differ both from each other and from those of official Baku. These differences can be only partially explained by specifics of the methodologies applied. Therefore, in order to maintain impartiality of the review, the ASSC data need to be juxtaposed with data from other sources, and for this purpose it is preferable to use data of only those organizations and structures that for many decades have been dealing with compiling, modeling and publishing population numbers and demographic data for all countries of the world.

Having reviewed about a dozen of such sources that publish demographic data, the following were selected as most characteristic ones: the US Census Bureau (*USCB*)¹, the US Central Intelligence Agency (*US CIA*)² with its annual *World FactBook* editions [1], the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (*UN DESA*)³ with its demographic database and *Demographic Yearbook (UN DYC)* annual reports [2], and International Monetary Fund (*IMF*) with its electronic database⁴. A few other reputable (the World Bank Development Prospects Group⁵, International Organization for Migration⁶ and others) and many not so rep-

¹ <http://www.census.gov/>

² <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/aj.html>

³ http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm

⁴ <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx>. This resource has been selected because IMF is a major source for socioeconomic data on Azerbaijan

⁵ WB DPG, see below.

⁶ IOM, see below.

utable organizations usually use one of the above mentioned four sources or rely on the official statistics.

The case of the US CIA *World FactBook* series deserves a special mention. As a matter of fact, the US CIA's estimates of demographic data use the results of modeling done at the USCB as a premise. Afterwards, these results are collated with information received from various other sources, as well as compared with own calculations. As a result, the US CIA data are very independent and tend to be relatively closer to reality. In all other sources the effect of accumulated distortions in modeling is visible. As for the AR national statistics data, they have always been subject to various falsifications.




Figure 1 summarizes data for the past 11 years on Azerbaijan’s population provided by the above mentioned four organizations in a single chart, where the ASSC official data on the same are also graphed. As seen in the figure, the presented sources can be divided in two groups. The first group includes IMF, USCB, UN DYB and official Baku’s data, which although differ from each other, but are close. It can be seen that USCB modeling results considerably overestimate the AR population size. The same is observed in IMF estimations, although it appears IMF experts tend to bring their results closer to official Baku’s claims.

Among these sources of the first group, the UN DYB [2] is worth a more detailed consideration, first of all since its data on Azerbaijan’s population are the closest to those of ASSC. Secondly, this is the source used in numerous studies of the AR demographics more frequently than any other, and is widely quoted especially in Azerbaijani media. And finally, although this is a publication by a reputable organization, it still contains many inexplicable and unsubstantiated estimates related to the AR demographic data, bringing confusion to the issue. *Table 2* summarizes all data on demographics of Azerbaijani Republic provided in the UN DYB 1992-2010 editions.

Data in the mentioned reports are presented in three groups. The first group contains population number estimates by the experts of the UN DESA Population Division (hereinafter referred to as UN PD) for a given year and types of these estimates, e.g. “own estimations”, “preliminary estimations”, etc. The second group of data include mid-year estimates of the total population of each country for some earlier year, type

UN PD estimate			Mid-year estimate					Base census			
year	million people	Note	year	million people	type	years	growth %	year	Total	M	F
									million people		
1992	7.392	Own	1985	6.661	DJ			1989	7.021	3.424	3.597
1993	7.392	Own	1990	7.153	DJ	1990-93	1.10%	1989	7.021	3.424	3.597
1994	7.472		1990	7.153	DJ	1990-94	1.10%	1989	7.021	3.424	3.597
1995	7.499	Own	1990	7.153	DJ	1990-05	0.90%	1989	7.021	3.424	3.597
1996	7.554	Prel.	1990	7.153	DJ	1990-06	0.90%	1989	7.021	3.424	3.597
1997	7.625	Prel.	1990	7.153	DJ	1990-05	0.90%	1989	7.021	3.424	3.597
1998	7.665	Prel.	1993	7.399	DJ	1993-98	0.70%	1999	7.953	4.119	3.834
1999	7.983	Prel.	1995	7.685	DJ	1995-99	1.10%	1999	7.953	4.119	3.834
2000	8.049	Prel.	1995	7.685	DJ	1995-00	0.90%	1999	7.953	4.119	3.834
2001	8.111		1995	7.685	DF	1995-01	0.90%	1999	7.953	3.883	4.070
2002	8.172		1995	7.685	DF	1995-02	0.90%	1999	7.953	3.883	4.070
2003	8.234		2000	8.049	DF	2000-03	0.80%	1999	7.953	3.883	4.070
2004	8.306		2000	8.049	DF	2000-04	0.80%	1999	7.953	3.883	4.070
2005	8.392	Prel.	2000	8.049	DF	2000-05	0.80%	1999	7.953	3.883	4.070
2006	8.485	Prel.	2000	8.049	DF	2000-06	0.90%	1999	7.953	3.883	4.070
2007	8.581		2005	8.392	DF	2000-07	1.10%	1999	7.953	3.883	4.070
2008	8.680		2005	8.392	DF	2005-08	1.10%	2009	8.922		
2009	No yearbook was published in 2009; instead an aggregate of 2009-10 issue was published next year										
2010	9.047		2005	8.5	DF	2005-10	1.20%	2009	8.922		

Source: UN *Demographic Yearbooks* [2]

of estimate (*DJ* – *de jure* population, *DF* – *de facto* population), and annual population growth rate for an examined period. The third, last group presents total population number of each country for a so-called *base year* used by UN Population Division experts, as well as data on population's distribution by sex. Usually, the year of the latest census with its official data is taken as the base year¹ by the UN PD experts.

¹ The base year data are used by the UN PD experts to model demographic patterns of a country and to make own estimations.

It follows from the *Table 2* that for instance, according to the 1993 UN DYB, the UN PD experts' own estimate of Azerbaijan's total population was 7.392 million in 1993. Also, a mid-year estimation was implemented for 1990 resulting in 7.153 million *de jure* population for that year, and for the period between 1990 and 1993 the annual population growth rate was estimated at 1.1%. These outputs shown in the UN DYB were based on data of 1989, taken as base year (the last USSR census year), the results of which for Azerbaijani SSR indicated a total population of 7.021 million at the time, of which 3.424 million were male and 3.597 million were female (with percentage distribution of 48.8% and 51.2% correspondingly).

The first thing inviting attention in *Table 2* is that according to the UN PD experts over the period of 1990-95 Azerbaijan's population had been steadily increasing at a quite significant rate of 1.0% annually. It has to be reminded that these were the years when USSR collapsed, socioeconomic systems of the former Soviet republics crumbled, while Azerbaijan was losing a war it had unleashed and the whole region was entangled in flows of refugees and migrants.

There is a vast literature about the demographic trends of the former USSR republics in the early post-Soviet period and all these sources point to the significant changes in demographic trends of all republics between early 1990s and end of the century [3]. However, despite the outflow of refugees from AR and almost complete removal of the Armenian, Russian, Jewish and other segments from AR population in early 1990s, the UN DYB issues for 1993-98 find it plausible to record an annual growth

rate of 1.0% of AR population for the period of 1990-95, likely following the instructions from Baku.

A closer look at the other data of *Table 2* reveals even more surprising details. For instance, the UN DYB 1998 (published in New York, in spring 2000) estimates population of the AR at 7.665 million, but interestingly, the base year used is 1999, i.e. the first census year of newly independent Azerbaijan¹. However, by the end of 2000 not only the summarization and analysis of the 1999 census data had not been completed, but even its preliminary results had not been published yet [4].

The next strange thing about the UN DYB 1998 is the distribution by sex of the AR population. According to the 1997 UN DYB, 1989 was taken as the base year with census results of 3.424 million males and 3.597 females (48.8% and 51.2% correspondingly). However, next year the UN DYB 1998 presents completely new base data of 4.119 million males and 3.834 million females corresponding to a proportion of 51.8% males and 48.2% females, without any explanation and clarification, using the **still unpublished and unknown data of the 1999 census**. As amusing as it is, again without any explanation or clarification, in three years the UN DYB 2001 switched back the proportion to 48.8% males and 51.2% females, this time with some **new absolute numbers**: 3.883 million and 4.070 million correspondingly (distribution of the AR population by sex will be discussed herein below).

¹ Azerbaijani President H. Aliev's decree No 422 of February 22, 1996 called for a census to be conducted same year. However, after that the census was delayed three times. Finally, with the help of the UN PD the census was carried out on January 27 - February 3, 1999.

The story almost repeats itself 10 years later in relation to the April 2009 census of the AR. The UN DYB 2008 (published in New York, in 2010) estimates the AR population of that year at 8.68 million using the 2009 base year census preliminary assessment of 8.922 million. However this time, as if wishing to avoid presentation of any bizarre figures, the UN DYB 2008 provides no base data on the AR population distribution by sex. Incidentally, no Yearbook was published in 2009; instead an aggregate of 2009-10 issue was published only in late 2011 (an extraordinary case in more than fifty years of history of the UN DYB, which is a food for thought).

The UN DYB data presented in *Table 2* contain another incomprehensible facet. As per the UN PD experts' own estimate presented in the UN DYB 1995, Azerbaijan's *de jure* population that year constituted 7.499 million. Whereas according to the UN DYB 1999, the mid-year estimate of *de jure* population for the very same year 1995 was 7.685 million. The source provides no clarifications whatsoever as to where these 186 thousand “additional” people appeared from. Also, the UN DYB reports provide no comments on the fact that the extraordinary estimate for 1995 mid-year (*de jure* population of 7.685 million) significantly exceeds the UN PD own estimates of the AR population for 1996, 1997 and even 1998 (7.544, 7.625 and 7.665 million, correspondingly). This is only part of the story. The UN DYB 2001 reinstates the same bizarre estimate of 7.685 million for 1995, but this time already as *de facto*, rather than *de jure* population. In the international practice of demographic statistics this is indeed a unique phenomenon.

Finally, the UN DYB 2000 estimates the AR population at 8.049 million. The reports of the subsequent years confirm this number until the UN DYB 2007, in which the mid-year estimate for 2000 states a new number, this time 8.39 million. And then, in DYB 2010 the same mid-year estimate for 2000 reaches 8.5 million. Once again, there is no explanation or comment as to where from or how these extra 0.5 million people emerged¹.

It seems there are enough grounds to contend that the UN DYB reports discussed above reflect manipulations by official Baku aimed at artificial increase of the AR population size. Moreover, it can be argued that the mentioned UN DYB reports in a way “validate” these manipulations by patronizing them under the umbrella of a reputable international organization. These very manipulations allowed recording an annual growth rate of around 1.0% for AR population in the UN DYB 1992 - 2010 reports, which contradicts to any and all adequate demographic studies for the post-Soviet republics (the annual growth of the AR population will be discussed later).

The pattern of the AR population is fundamentally different if one refers to the US CIA data. For example, according to the CIA World Fact-Book the population of the AR in 2011 was 8.372 million (July 2011 estimate). This is lower than the ASSC estimate by about 740,000. The CIA data on the AR population are summarized in *Table 3*. A comparison

¹ This estimated 0.5 million additional population of the AR that mysteriously appeared in the UN DYB 2009-2010 has to be kept in mind. As we shall see later in Chapter 4, it was needed for an attempt to disguise the manipulations of official Baku related to the country's female population growth.

with data of official Baku indicates that official assessments consistently overestimate the AR population relative to the CIA data for over 10 years. As it can be seen in this table, 1.0% or over annual rate of increase of the AR population is out of question. On the contrary, since mid-1990s the annual growth rate of Azerbaijan’s population had dropped down to 0.22%, and according to the CIA data it started to increase only since 2000. That year CIA recorded an annual population growth rate of 0.27% for the AR. To remind, official Baku maintains that the population growth rate in 2000 comprised 1.0% (see *Table 1*). The same population growth rate for the AR in the period between 2000 and 2007 is presented in the UN DYB 2007 report (see *Table 2*).


CIA estimates of population		Date of the estimate	Annual growth rate	Births	Deaths	Net Migration
year	people					
2000	7,748,163	July 2000	0.27%	18.08	9.47	-5.92
2001	7,771,092	July 2001	0.32%	18.44	9.55	-5.67
2002	7,798,497	July 2002	0.38%	18.84	9.61	-5.41
2003	7,830,764	July 2003	0.44%	19.28	9.68	-5.16
2004	7,868,385	July 2004	0.52%	19.81	9.76	-4.9
2005	7,911,974	July 2005	0.59%	20.4	9.86	-4.64
2006	7,961,619	July 2006	0.66%	20.74	9.75	-4.38
2007	8,120,247	July 2007	0.69%	17.47	8.35	-2.25
2008	8,120,247	July 2007	0.69%	17.47	8.35	-2.25
2009	8,238,672	July 2009	0.76%	17.62	8.3	-1.69
2010	8,303,512	July 2010	0.81%	17.75	8.28	-1.42
2011	8,372,373	July 2011	0.85%	17.85	8.25	-1.14

Source: US CIA World FactBooks [1]

In order to demonstrate the mentioned differences, *Figure 2* presents the divergence between ASSC and CIA estimates. As seen in the figure, over the past 11 years the ASSC data exceed those of CIA by half a million in average: if in 2000 the difference constituted 285 thousand, in 2011 it already reached 740 thousand. The most disturbing circumstance is that the overestimation did not come to an end or at least decline after the 2009 census in Azerbaijan. Quite the opposite, the divergence between data continues to increase.

Several clarifications need to be made in this regard. Firstly, the national statistical agencies of almost all countries tend to continuously adjust and recalculate data in their own reports. These amendments are periodically reported in publications of these agencies. Sometimes it is difficult to track all these changes over time. This situation has been further complicated in the current era of electronic publications, where the

Figure 2. Differences between the UN DYB and US CIA data on the population number of the Azerbaijani Republic (in thousands)




ongoing adjustments in the continuously updated websites could be identified only by comparing those with the hard copy materials published at the time or by constantly downloading and saving data from the websites so as to use them later for analysis. Such approach has been adopted in preparing this work; for example the CIA data are presented according to the hard copy publications of the 2000-2010 FactBook issues [1]¹. The same applies to the UN DYB reports for 1992-2010 [2].

Secondly, CIA population data are based on results of models developed by US Census Bureau², but they also use their own models and factor in other data obtained from the countries, including the official ones. In early 2007 the CIA model detected loss of validity in demographic data on population received from the AR, which prompted the CIA experts to forego any estimation for the AR population number next year. As a result, the CIA FactBook 2008 simply repeats the estimates of the previous year (see *Table 2*). More details on this can be found in the *World FactBook 2007* and *World FactBook 2008* [1].

Finally, it has to be noted that data produced by official statistical agencies of all ex-Soviet republics until early 2000s were characterized by significant flaws. This is especially visible with regards to data on total population numbers.

¹ Whereas data for 2011 are from the US CIA website, last visited September 2011.

² <http://www.census.gov/>



In order to maintain neutrality, let us review the history of the official *de facto* population data for the Republic of Armenia as shown in *Figure 3* [5, pp. 22-23]. Before the 2001 census, the official information on total population of Armenia was based on the results of censuses in 1979 and 1989¹. Starting 1993-94 and until the time when the official results of the 2001 census were published early 2003 [6], the total official population numbers for Armenia have been exceeding the CIA estimates by 500-600

¹ Data of the Armenian SSR 1989 census were pulled out of official circulation because the tragic consequences of the devastating Spitak earthquake did not allow properly conducting the census and ensuring the validity of data.

thousand. Publication of the 2001 census official results significantly improved the situation with the trustworthiness of demographic data for Armenia. Consequently, the situation with the official total population number for the RoA was enhanced through a correction in 2003; a drastic decrease was recorded from the 2001 number of 3.82 million to 3.2 million in 2002 (see *Figure 3* and reference [6]).

Many international and other organizations regarded this correction as significantly enhancing the situation with demographic statistics in Armenia. It seems the Republic of Armenia October 2011 census results will further improve the situation. Also, the highly appraised reliability and validity of the 2001 census official data has contributed to generally positive assessments of international organizations regarding the results of all Armenian national elections held after 2003¹.

Comparing this situation to the one with the ASSC official data on population of the AR, it has to be acknowledged that the 2009 census in this country has not led to correcting the situation and carried on with the distortions of statistical data that were started during the first AR population census in 1999. As a matter of fact, only partial data of the 2009 census results were at last published on July 22, 2011. At the time of this study (September – December 2011) the ASSC official website did not have a complete publication, while some individual results were scattered among the corresponding parts of the website.

¹ Understandably, this was not the only reason.

A review of these data brings the following conclusions:

- Even after the 2009 census, data on population size of Azerbaijan remain distorted. The migration processes characteristic to the transitional economies are completely misrepresented.
- The ASSC official data on total population are based on a simplistic, linear extrapolation and they misrepresent the real pattern of the population growth, as well as distort the information on births and deaths.
- Demographic statistics of official Baku slant data on population's distribution by sex.
- Retaining the ill practices of Azerbaijani SSR, demographic statistics of official Baku continue to systematically misrepresent the data on the republic's ethnic composition.


These issues are more thoroughly reviewed below.

Chapter 2

MIGRATION

Based on data from “International migration of population” (*Əhalinin beynəlxalq miqrasiyası*) Table 1.26 posted in the ASSC official website¹, the migration flow patterns of the country as per data of official Baku are graphed in *Figure 4*. As shown in the Figure, the mentioned source assumes the “migration flows” as the number of people who left from or arrived in the country only for permanent residence. According to this source, 84,300 people arrived in and 137,900 left Azerbaijan for “permanent living” [sic] in 1990. In 2010 these numbers constitute 2,200 and 800, correspondingly. Net migration (as specified in the English version of the website), i.e. the difference between the numbers of those arrived and departed, turns positive starting 2008.

¹ http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demographic/en/AP_/1_26.xls



Source: http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demographic/az/AP_/AZ_1.shtml

A totally different pattern is uncovered when one refers to the international sources that study migration flows. Unlike ASSC, in estimating the population size of any country, they meticulously account for the entire migration flows, i.e.: (a) labor migrants residing abroad for

one year and over; (b) refugees; (c) asylum seekers; (d) internally displaced persons; (e) forced migrants, etc. The mentioned ASSC source is condescendingly silent about all these types of migration.

Meanwhile, according to the reports of the International Organization for Migration (*IOM*)¹, emigration from Azerbaijan constituted 1.365 million people by the end of 2005, which the same source estimates at 16.2% of the total *de jure* population for the same year² [7, p. 17]. Thus, as indicated by IOM, in 2005 the AR population amounted to 7.06 million. The CIA FactBook 2005 [1] provides an estimate close to that: 7.9 million (July 2005 est.), assessing the net migration for the year at -4.64 migrants per 1000 of population, i.e. -36,700 people. Whereas according to the ASSC official data, in 2005 the population of Azerbaijan was 8.5 million and the net migration constituted -900 people (see the Figure 5), i.e. about 41 times smaller than the CIA estimate.

The World Bank Development Prospects Group (WB DPG) *Migration and Remittances Factbooks*³ are a well-known and comprehensive source for information on migration flows. According to this source, in 2010 there was a 1.43 million strong stock of migrants from Azerbaijan living abroad, which comprises 16% of the country's population for that

¹ <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/lang/en/pid/1>

² According to IOM these assessments are conservative (underestimated). Citing results of the research [9], the source estimates Azerbaijan's actual out-migration at 16-25% of the country's *de jure* populations.

³ World Bank, Development Prospects Group. *Migration and Remittances Factbooks*.

year [8, p. 75]. The number of Azerbaijani migrants abroad hit a record high 1.55 million in 2008. Next year this number dropped down to 1.2 million, apparently due to the global financial crisis [8].

It has to be considered that the WB DPG data on migrants abroad are conservative (underrated), because they include only the migrants who make bank transfers. Hence, those who do not make money transfers through banks or make them in another manner are left out of the sight of WB DPG.

The WB DPG source is interesting in that it estimates migration in both unilateral and bilateral dimensions, resulting in noteworthy information. In this manner, the WB DPG experts have compiled a 215 x 215 *Bilateral Migration Matrix* for 215 countries of the world, which has been regularly updated during the last decade. It has to be noted that almost all other international organizations (UN, IOM, OECD, IMF, etc.) use the data of this matrix for their studies of migration and population estimations of the countries. *Table 4* below is based on the WB DPG *Bilateral Migration Matrix* for 2010, simplified to include only data on the three South Caucasus countries. Also, only top ten destinations for Azerbaijani migrants are included here, whereas the complete table is provided in Annex 1 (Table 1.1). The same Annex includes also a reverse matrix showing the number of migrants from other countries in the three South Caucasus countries as of end-2010 (see Annex 1, Table 1.2).

Table 4. Migration in South Caucasus in 2010, in thousands		Source country			From the three countries of South Caucasus	
		Azerbaijan	Georgia	Armenia		
Destination country	1	Russian Federation	866,843	644,390	493,126	2,004,359
	2	Armenia	164,483	75,792		240,275
	3	Other South	145,784	98,123	76,329	320,236
	4	Ukraine	92,536	72,410	53,193	218,138
	5	Kazakhstan	38,921	2,635	7,357	48,912
	6	Israel	35,101	26,032	16,509	77,643
	7	Germany	23,265	18,164	15,515	56,944
	8	Turkey	18,807	7,295	891	26,993
	9	USA	9,689	25,310	77,208	112,206
	10	Turkmenistan	7,895	0	7,248	15,142
Total		1,433,513	1,058,300	870,458	3,362,271	

Source: <http://go.worldbank.org/JITC7NYTTO>

As seen in *Table 4*, as of end-2010 there were 1.433 million migrants from the AR in different countries, of which about 867 thousand or 60% of total were in Russian Federation (the same country hosted 644 thousand migrants from Georgia or 60% of the total, and 493 thousand migrants from Armenia or 56% of the total)¹. In total, by the end of 2010 there were 2.0 million migrants from the three South Caucasus republics in the Russian Federation. Interestingly, the number of migrants from Azerbaijan in Israel was by 10 thousand higher than that of migrants from Georgia, and by 20 thousand higher than that of migrants from Armenia. According to the WB DPG methodology, the 164.5 thousand people from AR staying in Armenia are those who made money transfers

¹ As a reminder, these are only the migrants who made money transfers recorded in the bank system.

Table 5. Remittances to the three South Caucasus countries in 2010, US\$ million			Remittance-receiving country			To the three countries of South Caucasus
			Azerbaijan	Georgia	Armenia	
Remittance-sending country	1	Russian Federation	898.657	490.568	436.471	1,825.696
	2	Armenia	154.681	45.878		200.559
	3	Other South	137.096	58.045	53.773	248.913
	4	Ukraine	87.021	43.361	37.473	167.855
	5	Israel	45.409	27.659	20.071	93.139
	6	Kazakhstan	39.057	1.912	6.224	47.193
	7	Germany	33.790	22.790	22.127	78.707
	8	Turkey	19.508	5.558	0.789	25.855
	9	USA	14.629	33.528	116.034	164.191
	10	Turkmenistan	7.424		5.330	12.755
Total for 2010			1,472	824	824	2,296

Source: <http://go.worldbank.org/JITC7NYTTO>

from Armenia that have been recorded by the WB DPG experts. It can be assumed with a high likelihood that these remittances were made to the relatives in Artsakh.

Based on the Bilateral Migration Matrix and information from banking systems, the WB DPG experts also compose three other 215 x 215 bilateral matrixes for migrants' money transfers (Inward remittance)¹: (i) Bilateral remittance estimates (in current US dollars) using migrant stocks; (ii) Bilateral remittance estimates using migrant stocks and destination country incomes; and (iii) Bilateral remittance estimates using migrant stocks, destination country incomes, and source country incomes.

¹ The mentioned source then differentiates three types of money transfers from migrants: workers' remittances, compensation of employees, and migrant transfers.

Using data of the mentioned last matrix, *Table 5* below shows the remittances to the three South Caucasus countries. Top ten remittance-sending countries for the AR are listed here, whereas the complete table is provided in Annex 1 (Table 1.3), which also includes the reverse matrix (Table 1.4) showing the amounts of money transfers from the three Transcaucasia republics to other countries.

As seen in *Table 5*, in 2010 \$1.472 billion was transferred to the AR from 51 countries of the world (see Annex 1), whereas remittances to Georgia and Armenia amounted to \$0.824 billion each¹. At the same time remittances from Russian Federation to Azerbaijan amounted to \$900 million (\$491 million to Georgia, and \$437 million to Armenia).


About \$155 million was transferred from Armenia to Azerbaijan² (\$45 million to Georgia). At the same time, in 2010 about \$33.6 million was transferred from Azerbaijan to Armenia (and \$3.5 million from Georgia, see Annex 1). Hence, net remittances from RoA to AR amounted to \$118 million as of end-2010. Under the WB DPG methodology these are the remittances from Armenia to Artsakh and vice versa.

¹ According to the data from the Republic of Armenia Central Bank, as of end-2010 money transfers worth total \$1.627 billion were made by physical persons abroad to Armenia, whereas remittances from Armenia to other countries amounted to \$731.6 million. Thus, the net balance of remittances for Armenia amounted to \$895.5 million. Russian Federation and USA together were source of 76.1% of total transfers to Armenia and destination for 38.3% of those from Armenia. The difference between the WB DPG and RoA Central Bank estimates of remittances can be partially explained by the fact that the Central Bank of Armenia states the amounts directly in US dollars based on official exchange rates, whereas the WB DPG data presented herein are adjusted according to destination and source country incomes (purchasing power).
<http://www.cba.am/am/SitePages/statexternalsector.aspx>

² As mentioned above, under the WB DPG methodology these are the remittances from Armenia to Artsakh and vice versa.

It has to be mentioned that the total amount of remittances from Armenia to Artsakh is very close to the official figure of the total development aid provided to Azerbaijani Republic by all developed countries of the world (*Official development assistance*, \$200 million, see [8]). And the 2010 year-end total amount of migrants' remittances to Azerbaijan of (\$1.5 billion) is quite comparable to the gold and currency strategic reserves of this country in the same period (\$6.4 billion, see [1]). It seems these data would surprise some of our colleagues in the AR.

Based on the WB DPG online database *Figure 5* depicts the patterns the migrants' remittances to Azerbaijan over the period between 1995



Source: <http://go.worldbank.org/092X1CHHD0>

and 2010 (in current US\$ million). Same data on Armenia and Georgia are presented on the graph for comparison. As it can be told from *Figure 5*, remittances to Georgia in 1997-2000 were about \$400 million annually and more than twice exceeded those to Armenia or Azerbaijan. Since 2004 remittances to Armenia have been increasing; they surpassed those to Georgia and peaked at \$1.062 billion in 2008. During the next years they decreased due to the global financial crisis, and in 2009-2010 amounted to \$800 million annually. In turn, remittances to Azerbaijan have been drastically increasing since 2005, in that year surpassing those to Armenia. They reach a maximum of \$1.6 billion in 2008. Over the next years they decreased for same reason, and in 2009-2010 amounted to annual \$1.2 and \$1.4 billion, correspondingly.

The patterns are somewhat different if average annual amount of remittances to their countries per migrant are considered. This number was calculated based on the WB DPG migration matrix and remittances matrix. *Figure 6* shows the results of calculation for the three South Caucasus countries in 2003-2010. The presented results indicate that according to the WB DPG data annual amount of remittances to Armenia per migrant significantly exceeded those to Georgia and only in 2010 fell under those to Azerbaijan.

As already mentioned, the WB DPG data on labor migrants from AR (as well as from any other country) are inevitably conservative, because these are based on statistics of remittances made by them through the banking systems. Indeed, some Russian and Azeri sources [10] contend that the actual number of migrants from Azerbaijan (mostly in the Russ-


ian Federation) is estimated at 2.0-3.0 million. Already in 2001 Russian President V. Putin stated during his official visit to Azerbaijan that 2.7 million Azerbaijanis live in Russia, of which 660 thousand are RF citizens, and the rest are labor migrants [11]. After the 2002 census in Russian Federation these estimates decreased¹, however, a number of reputable sources continue estimating the number of Azeris in the country at 2.0 million. Some Russian analysts seriously questioned the results of the 2002 RF census, insisting that the census was able to account for only 40% of Azerbaijanis residing in the RF [13].

Concluding the review of Azerbaijani migrants, it has to be also noted that migrant prostitution and sex trafficking are inherent to this process. These phenomena reached a considerable magnitude after 1995-97, when amidst economic crisis and overall demoralization of the society some Azeri women started to leave Azerbaijan for Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Syria and Iran.

According to the above mentioned IOM data and some reports in Azerbaijani media [14], in 1990-1999 Turkey alone expelled 750 Azeri women for prostitution, of which 650 during the period between 1996 and 1999. From 2001 to April 2003, 900 Azeri women were deported from UAE for the same reason. The same source states that in February 1999 alone the Turkish authorities registered 6,000 Azerbaijani women that were involved in prostitution. In the same period UAE authorities

¹ As per data of the Russian Federation 2002 census 621,840 ethnic Azerbaijanis lived in the country, of which 154,900 were citizens of Azerbaijan. According to the 2002 census the number of ethnic Armenians living in the RF was 1.13 million, of which 136,800 were Armenian nationals [12].

Figure 6. Remittances per migrant made to their respective countries (in US\$)



registered 2,000 Azerbaijani prostitutes [15]. Azerbaijani media [16] reported that since mid-2000s new trafficking and migrant prostitution channels appeared to Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Thailand and India: “every year about 1000 Azerbaijani women are regularly taken out of the country by organizers of trafficking and only few make their way back home” [16]. The same source asserts there is a considerable seasonal trafficking. Actually, every summer about 500-600 young girls and women are airlifted from the AR to Turkey. In Baku airport a bribe of about \$500 is paid for each woman. This prompted the pimping businesses to tap on new “export” routes through Nakhichevan and Georgia. Such business in the direction of UAE is even more massive. According to the same source, 1,500-1,800 Azeri girls and women are dispatched

from Azerbaijan to UAE in summer seasons. The source contends that monetary flows into Azerbaijan from pimping business amount to about \$1 million per season.

* * *

Thus, the presented information indicates that even after publication of the 2009 census results in the AR, the official Baku statistics continue misrepresenting the data on actual population of the country through inadequate assessment of migration flows. The official sources fail to account for the labor migrants in their statistical data and reduce the numbers of net migration from the AR by tens of times.

On the other hand, a conservative estimate of the number of migrants from this country based on statistics of remittances through banks is about 1.2-1.5 million people. This number can be accepted as a minimal estimate of Azerbaijani migrants abroad. The actual number of migrants from the AR is close to 2.0-2.2 million. Furthermore, emigration from the AR has been drastically increasing since 2004.

However, in addition to ignoring the migration processes, official Baku garbles the demographic statistics in other manners, too.


Chapter 3

POPULATION GROWTH RATE

The ASSC official numbers for the AR total population for the last three years (8.922 million, 8.998 million and 9.111 million for 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively) follow the so-called “linear growth” trend adopted by ASSC in the years before. This linear growth “model” fails to reflect the actual pattern of the country’s demographic trends.

Figure 7 below depicts Azerbaijan’s increase of population in 1965-2011 based on data of official Baku as of 2011. As seen, it is quite linear and can be approximated by a simple linear equation with 99.85% of accuracy (the red line in the graph). When compared with the population growth curves of other ex-Soviet republics (for Armenia, see *Figure 3* hereinabove) it is hard to shed the doubts that such pattern is artificial.

Reviewing the graph of annual growth rate of Azerbaijan’s population (%), its artificial nature becomes obvious. The annual growth rate is presented in *Figure 8*, where the intentional distortion of the growth rates since 1997-98 is apparent.




Sources: “1.3. Əhalinin cins üzrə sayı (min nəfər)”.


http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demographic/az/AP_/AZ_1.shtml and our own analysis

Indeed, contrary to the trend of the previous six years, in the period from 1997 to 2004 the annual growth rate of Azerbaijan’s population suddenly “stabilizes” at the level of 1% per annum. Since 2004-2005 it inexplicably soars and in 2009, the country census year, reaches unbelievably high 1.62%. After this an even less understandable thing happens. In 2010 annual growth rate of Azerbaijan’s population abruptly declines down to 0.84%. Such odd fluctuations of the annual population growth parameter, which is subject to years-long inertial cycles, call for an explanation. Unfortunately, neither the ASSC official website, nor the accessible literature on issues of Azerbaijan’s demographic statistics, nor the publications commenting on the 2009 AR census provide such explanation.

In order to consider this phenomenon in the relevant historical demographic perspective, it has to be mentioned that according to some serious, specialized sources, during the Soviet rule the demographic patterns of Azerbaijani SSR underwent changes characteristic to a transition from the Asian (Central Asian) family lifestyle to the European one. This transition could be characterized by two attributes: (i) the number of large families (with 3 or more children) had been dropping, whereas (ii) the reproductive and socioeconomic characteristics of the rural families had been tending to come close to those of urban families, in turn leading to reduction of the number of large families in rural areas as well [3]. Consequently, from 1960s till the collapse of the USSR, Azerbaijani SSR was characterized by a decades-long significant and stable decline of the annual population growth rate.



Source: http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demographic/az/AP_/AZ_1.shtml



Source: [3], <http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2011/0451/barom04.php>

The same source contends that the post-Soviet reproductive demographic trends of the AR are characterized by a similar behavior for at least another decade. For instance, *Figure 9* replicates one of the charts from the mentioned source (see [3], Fig. 12), which separately shows the curves of aggregate fertility rate per woman of Azerbaijani SSR and Azerbaijani Republic for urban, rural and total population over the period between 1960 and 2010. As seen, in 1960s aggregate fertility rate of rural women significantly exceeded that of urban women. This difference had been consistently shrinking over the 1970-80s, as a consequence of the mentioned trend of transition to European family lifestyles. This phenomenon is reflected in convergence of fertility rate curves for rural and

urban women in *Figure 9*. In mid-1990s these curves almost coincide approximately at the threshold of sub-replacement fertility (2.1 children per woman). In early 1990s the aggregate fertility rate for urban women drops down to 2.8. In 1996-2003, the value of this rate for urban women drops below the sub-replacement fertility threshold, reaches 1.6 and stays at that level at least during 1998-2002¹. The situation is similar with rural women, for whom the aggregate fertility rate in the same period reaches the threshold. As a result the aggregate fertility rate for all women of Azerbaijan is below the sub-replacement fertility threshold at least for the period from 1998 to 2002.

Oddly, this fertility pattern is by no means reflected in population data of official Baku (see *Table 1* herein). Furthermore, it appears there are enough grounds to argue that official Baku’s manipulations with population number and annual growth rate are aimed at disguising this circumstance. It is a different matter that such a primitive trick as sudden increase of population number by 0.5 million, which was touched upon in the discussion of the UN DYB (see *Table 2* and further), so to speak, is ineffective, because it fails to cover up the realities related to fertility and mortality statistics.

Remarkably, such primitive manipulation underlies also the “inexplicable” and sudden fall of the AR annual population growth rate from 1.62% in 2009 to 0.84% next year. To illustrate this it suffices to draw the


¹ According to the same source the fertility rate for Armenia had dropped below the sub-replacement fertility already in 1994.

curves of the AR annual population growth rates based on the ASSC and US CIA data in a single chart (see *Figure 10*). Here the evident and considerable difference between these datasets is not so much of interest for a moment. Although it must be noted, that the 1997-2004 population growth rate estimate of around 1.0% by official Baku that is so readily repeated by the UN PD, is in sharp contrast with the US CIA estimate of the annual growth rate diminishing down to 0.22%, then gradually increasing to 0.55%.

Let us focus on another pattern, which is the increasing difference between estimates of these two sources starting 2004. This difference peaks in 2009, the census year in the AR. Next year, in an attempt to adjust to some extent to the expectations of international organizations from the population census in the AR and in other to alleviate the glaring difference between the estimates, the ASSC experts saw no problem in adopting a value of 0.84% for the AR annual growth rate, which close to that of the US CIA (0.81%) for 2010. This appears to be the best explanation for the mysterious behavior of the AR annual population growth rate for 2010. Obviously, nothing is solved or corrected by such a primitive “adjustment”.

To understand that, suffice it to compare ASSC and CIA data on births, deaths and net migration, i.e. the factors that shape the annual population growth. *Figure 11* below presents these data in absolute numbers (rather than in percentages or per 1000 population as normally done in the US CIA reports).

**Figure 10. Population growth rate (%) of the Azerbaijani Republic:
ASSC and CIA data**




Without going into much details of comparative analysis of these data, let us just note that for the last 11 years official Baku has been consistently underestimating the mortality rates¹ and net migration values, and overestimating birth rate values². A number of Azerbaijani researchers have come to the same conclusions [9, 15].

Yet there is more to come.

¹ For instance, according to the data of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, the infant mortality rate in Azerbaijan in 2006 was 16 times higher than the average rate for Europe. The maternal mortality rate in Azerbaijan exceeded the average value for Europe 10 times [17].

² The US CIA 2000-2006 estimates of birth rate in Azerbaijan were higher than those of official Baku due to the initial differences between total population estimates and peculiarities of the models used by the US Census Bureau. As a reminder, loss of trust toward credibility of data received from Azerbaijan made the CIA experts forego demographic estimations for this country in 2008 (see *Table 3*).




Chapter 4

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY SEX

In addition to total population number and annual growth rate, manipulations of official Baku also focus on population distribution by sex. There is every reason to believe that it is done to “justify” the statement of Azerbaijani leaders made on numerous occasions that “9-million-strong Azerbaijan will never accept the loss of its territories”.

It should be noted that most of these manipulations with statistical data have been quite primitive, making them easy to uncover even with a superficial analysis. Some of such examples were examined above. A few others, such as bread production and consumption statistics or number of registered voters, have already been reviewed in other publications [18]. Also, it has to be mentioned that some Azerbaijani publications took note of the contrived nature of the “theatrical show” organized on the occasion of the birth of the 9 millionth Azerbaijani [19].

Anyhow, the faulty practice continues using and with that, proclamations about “the first Azerbaijani baby-boom” are circulated and talks



Source: UN Demographic Yearbooks [2]

about “10-million-strong Azerbaijan in near future” are already heard [20], which one may presume, will so much less “accept the loss of its territories”. For understandable reasons statistical data on the number and age distribution of *female* population are key factors for all of this. Hence, in this issue we shall refer to the relevant data from official Baku and other sources.

Figure 12 summarizes the population distribution by sex in the AR for base (census) years as per the UN DYB. As a reminder, the base year, i.e. the latest census year data are used by the UN PD experts to build their own models and estimate population size for a given year, as well

as to estimate the mid-year population number. Thus, strictly speaking the male and female population growth curves in *Figure 12* do not have any dynamic “sense”. These are not true time series curves, unlike the total population growth curve, which is. However, *Figure 12* does demonstrate the practice of Azerbaijani official statistics (and the UN PD) related to the issue and is very expressive in this respect.

Indeed, as already mentioned the UN DYB 1998 accepts preliminary data of yet officially unpublished and preliminary results of the 1999 census as base data, considerably changing the base for population distribution by sex compared to the 1989 census results (from 48.8% males and 51.2% females to 51.8% and 48.2%, correspondingly). The number of females was increased by 237,000 (up from 3.597 million to 3.834 million).

This new proportion is maintained until the UN DYB 2001 issue, where the old proportion of 48.8% males and 51.2% females is brought back after partial publication of the 1999 census results. This time again, the number of female population is increased drastically by additional 236 thousand. Hence, for the period of 1997-2001 the female population was increased by 0.5 million by a simple manipulation of statistical data and AR 1999 census results. These are the very 0.5 million people that are referred to in Chapter 1 (see *Table 2* and further) in the analysis of the UN DYB data. Emergence of this additional population is in no way commented about by the UN PD experts. On the other hand, it will be shown in the next chapter how these 0.5 million females are added to the population of AR.

It is easy to guess the true reason for these manipulations, most likely dictated by official Baku. Such manipulations had been required to ensure a sufficient “reproductive base”, in turn to rationalize a high enough annual population growth rate for the AR, so that the “edict” of Aliyev dynasty about “9 or 10-million-strong and adamant Azerbaijan” could have been more or less justified biologically.

Nevertheless, population of any country is the simple arithmetical sum of its male and female population numbers¹. It is hard to constantly increase only the number of females without distorting the overall pattern.


If the *Figure 12* is not enough, one may directly examine the data on female population of the country stated by ASSC as of December 2011. Thus, based on official data of ASSC (see the downloaded data in Annex 2), *Figure 13* depicts data on the AR female population from 1959 to 2011. It is evident in this chart that the 1999 census data significantly differ from the trends of the previous decades. By the way, these trends should be a source of serious concern for the Azerbaijani authorities, because they point to a rapid *reduction* of the country’s female population.

Indeed, according to a number of reputable organizations (UNICEF, WB, WHO), the phenomenon of female population rapid reduction, especially in younger age cohorts, is typical to countries with transitional


¹ And hopefully, this statement will remain true for some time.

economies and “Asian, Muslim social models” of development. It is driven by the wide spread of accessible and accurate fetal sex determination techniques, which boost to significant levels the social trend of selective female embryo abortion, already existing in such societies (the so-called “unwanted girl” phenomenon). Under the pressure of the above mentioned international organizations, as well as some Azerbaijani NGOs, this issue at last started to receive attention even in the Azerbaijani media [21] (see also [22]).

The official data of the 1999 census conveniently “solves” this problem by a sudden increase of the female population, en passant



Source: http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demographic/en/AP/AP_1.shtml



Source: http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demographic/en/AP_/AP_1.shtml

solving also the issue of “biological justification” of a “9-million-strong Azerbaijan.”

When the absolute numbers of male and female population annual growth are plotted on a chart, as done in *Figure 14* herein, the fictitious nature of these data from official Baku becomes most obvious. It should be emphasized, that the chart is based on the same official data (see Annex 2) that were used for *Figure 13*. However, in *Figure 14* data series from 1960 to 2011 are used and growths of both male and female populations (in thousands) relative to the previous years are graphed.

As it follows from *Figure 14*, according to the ASSC data in 1999, i.e. the first census year of the newly independent Azerbaijan, the female

population of the country grew by 76.8 thousand relative to the previous year. Whereas the male population of the AR not only stopped growing, but even shrunk by 100 men.

It seems no comments are needed.

* * *

In summary of the review of the AR population number, its annual growth rate, statistics of migration flows, births and deaths, as well as data on population distribution by sex, the following should be noted.

Currently the South Caucasus region is in an ongoing information and psychological warfare. One of its characteristics is the systematic misrepresentation of demographic statistics and wide use of distorted data to stage the warfare. Without exaggeration every day it is possible to read, hear and see in the Azerbaijani press and electronic media, in statements of official, semi-official and non-official representatives, in the TV channels, radio broadcasts and various websites that “Armenia is getting emptied, and 9-million-strong Azerbaijan will not tolerate a loss of its territories”, that “soon, very soon Azerbaijan will emerge as even a more powerful, 10-million-strong nation”, and finally, that “it is time to establish a Pan-Turkic state with population of 110 million, comprised of 10-million-strong Azerbaijan, 30 million Azerbaijani population of northern Iran and 70-million-strong Turkey” and that “not only the region, but also the whole world will have to reckon with such a giant.”


In this context actions of official Baku related to own statistical data on the country's population are generally understandable, although inappropriate for a society civilized at least to some extent. However, actions of the UN PD, which repeats the fairy tales of official Baku related to the population of the country, are even less comprehensible. This concerns not only the distorted data reports on Azerbaijan in their Yearbooks [2], although this is already a great deal. Unfortunately, the UN PD goes even further in spreading the "statistical data" of official Baku.

During the last 20 years the UN PD presents demographic data for almost all countries of the world in its well-known online database¹. The UN PD database also allows modeling the population trends for countries till the year 2100 in three population growth scenarios: high, medium and low variants. These trends can be not only modeled, but also visualized for a given country or group of countries². So what pattern for the three South Caucasus countries will appear before the eyes of a curious user of this database? The result for the period of 1950-2100 is shown in *Figure 15*.

As seen, according to the UN PD experts, in case of the high growth scenario by the end of the 21st century the AR population will comprise

¹ http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm

² We would like to caution the visitors of the UN PD electronic library to be wary of the good-looking charts and high-sounding names (such as double logarithmic fertility curve, Bayesian Hierarchical Modeling, etc.). As we shall see later, all of this is rather senseless in case of the AR. As the saying popular among the modeling professionals goes, "garbage in, garbage out", no matter how complex and sophisticated your model is.



Sources: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm and own calculations.

19.4 million, whereas that for Armenia and Georgia will amount to 4.0 and 4.1 million, respectively (the curves for Georgia are not shown in *Figure 15*). The details of modeling results for all considered scenarios are presented in Annex 3). Hence, in this scenario by 2100 the population of Azerbaijan will exceed that of Armenia and Georgia in aggregate by more

than twice. The situation is even more “dismal” for the low growth scenario. In this case the AR population (7 million) will be more than 3 times larger than that of Armenia and Georgia together (1.2 million each).

For an unprepared user of the mentioned database, who is unfamiliar with the long history of systematic distortions by official Baku and is uninitiated in “peculiarities” of reporting statistical data on AR population in the UN PD publications, this pattern may be shocking. It has to be noted that the UN PD database is a popular source for numerous publications around the world. It is almost the only international source for the publications in Azerbaijani media. And this pattern remains widely accessible at the UN PD website, without any comments or caveats. Yet comments here would have been more than relevant and necessary as ever, since the presented results of the UN DYB contain a number of unsubstantiated assumptions, distortions and falsifications.

Thus, the presented results of the UN PD raise a number of questions.

First, the high growth scenario for 2015-2100 proposed by the UN PD experts is generally linear (see Figure 15, the green line). For one and a half century period of 1950-2100 it can be approximated by a simple linear equation with accuracy of 99.78% and is remarkably similar to the pattern of the official data presented by ASSC for 1950-2011 (see *Figure 7* hereinabove). It appears there is every reason to argue that the UN PD experts use the primitive and unrealistic linear model of population growth for Azerbaijani SSR/AR applied by ASSC “specialists” for many decades (1950-2011), thus unblinkingly extrapolating it for almost a century-long period up to 2100.

Second, the UN PD experts use only official ASSC numbers of population, without any examination or comments. However, the comments would have been more than appropriate, at least with regard to the blatant distortion of the AR population numbers, growth rate and distribution by age and sex, which are typical to both ASSC data and the UN DYB (see [3], *Table 2* above, and further).


Third, the actual population number curve for Armenia (as well as for Georgia) in the period prior to 1995 has a characteristic breakpoint at around 1990-95 (see *Figure 15*, marked with an ellipse). Indeed, the breakup of the USSR, collapse of the socio-economic system, onset of regional conflicts and intensive processes of migration inside and outside of the region, at the time led to significant changes in the demographic situation of all South Caucasus republics. Then why all of this passed unnoticed in case of the Azerbaijani Republic's population? The answer that one might get from the UN PD experts is “because these are the official data, received from the country's official statistical services.”

Incidentally, the UN PD experts have diligently accounted for the retroactive recalculation of Armenia's population number back to 1990, performed by the RoA National Statistical Service (see *Figure 3*) in accordance with the 2001 RoA census results. Thus, the UN PD experts on the one hand, in case of Armenia, quite meticulously took into account demographic statistical recalculation and corrective improvement based on the 2001 RoA census results, and on the other hand, in case of Azerbaijan, they cool-headedly repeated ab-

surd official numbers of the AR 1999 and 2009 censuses. All of this was done without any comments and assessments regarding the reliability and validity of the presented data, or concerns about lack of corrective improvements in the AR population data after two national censuses.

Yet the most curious aspect is the recording/modeling of migration flows for the three South Caucasus republics, based on net migration. As a reminder, a negative value of net migration means prevalence of emigration (population outflow), whereas positive value of net migration indicates prevalence of immigration (population inflow). In the UN PD online database the net migration numbers are presented in totals for 5-year intervals, so the average annual net migration values for these periods can be calculated. *Figure 16* presents these average annual values based on the mentioned part of the UN PD online database.

So how come for the period of 1990-95 net migration for Armenia and Georgia was estimated at about -110,000 annually each, while for Azerbaijan it was -23,000? How come for the period of 1995-2000 net migration for Armenia was estimated at -45,000 (and -78,000 for Georgia), whereas for Azerbaijan it was -26,000? An apparent answer from the UN PD experts in case of Azerbaijan would be: “because that is the official statistics of Azerbaijan.” However, the official statistics of Armenia for those years is different from the data used by the UN PD. Then why the UN PD experts do not base their estimates on official statistics in case of Armenia, as they do it in case of the AR?



Source: <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/migration.htm>.

After all, are the UN PD experts unaware that according to a number of reputable international organizations¹ by early 2008 there were 1.5 million migrants from Azerbaijan residing abroad? Do they not know that in 2010 the migrant stock of the AR remitted about US\$1.5 billion from abroad to Azerbaijan (see *Tables 4 and 5*

¹ IOM, WB DPG, etc.

herein) through the international banking system? And this is the amount of remittances adjusted for purchasing power parity. The actual amount (in current dollars) is about 1.5 times larger. And this concerns only those Azerbaijani migrants who made remittances to Azerbaijan in a given year using the services of the international banking system. Certainly there were also migrants who transferred money to the country using other channels, or did not make any remittances at all. The actual number of migrants from Azerbaijan is a lot higher and according to some reliable estimates, by 2010 it constituted about 2.0-2.2 million. A sizeable portion of this migrant stock was formed in 1995-2005 (see Chapter 2). How could this migrant stock appear under such absurdly low migration numbers as shown for AR in *Figure 16*?

Also, as seen in Figure 16, according to the UN PD net migration for Azerbaijan in the period of 2000-2010 in average comprised about +11,000 annually (+110,000 over the period of 10 years in 2001-2010). It would be interesting to know why. This time even the standard answer “because that is the official Baku statistics” would not help the UN PD experts. That is because even official Baku presents completely different data in this case.

Let us first recall that as per ASSC approach for calculating net migration, *only* those arriving or departing for permanent residence are accounted for (see Chapter 2 or the ASSC website). We shall not reprove the UN PD experts for turning a blind eye on such an unprecedented

approach of ASSC “experts”¹. We shall rather invite their attention to the fact, that even with such uncommon approach, official Baku estimated the net migration for 2001-2010 at about -14,000, or -1.4 thousand annually in average (see Figure 4 hereinabove). Then why the UN PD experts in their models aggravate the already absurd situation and bring the net migration number for 2001-2010 up to +110 thousand, surpassing even official Baku in this aspect?

All of this is quite bizarre and distasteful. Yet the way in which UN PD database forecasts net migration in 2010-2100 for South Caucasus countries is simply ridiculous (see Figure 16, after 2015). Why net migration for Azerbaijani Republic equals to zero for the whole period of 2015-2100? Why emigration from Georgia stops in 2055 and why it continues for Armenia till 2100? These are questions, which one may presume can be answered only by official Baku, but not the UN PD experts who act as obedient stooges of the latter.

In summary, it seems necessary to raise the following questions for the authors of the above mentioned online database of the UN PD.

First, if this database simply repeats the official statistical data from countries, then why is it needed in the first place? Such data are accessible at national statistical agencies and a source that simply repeats them appears redundant². Even without that official Baku already floods

¹ Though sooner or later somebody neutral will hopefully do that.

² Even more so, as they are repeated in the UN Demographic Yearbooks.

the internet with falsified demographic statistics about its country, and intensively uses that in the information and psychological warfare.

Second, if the mentioned UN PD database is intended to do more, for example, to model/forecast the population for long future periods, then why the UN PD experts seem so unconcerned about the *reliability* and *validity* of their modeling results? Surely it is impossible to perform adequate modeling if the input data are known to be garbled. For a more or less knowledgeable specialist in computer simulation and forecasting it is a given that estimating reliability and validity of the input data comes first. If it is impossible to improve those by own means or desire, then the uncertainties in the modeling must be estimated and taken into account first, and afterwards the modeling/forecasting results should be categorized according to their *relative* reliability.

Third, do the UN PD experts realize that by ignoring the issue of *reliability/validity* and using only the estimates of the national statistical services as input data, they so to speak “validate” and amplify both positive and negative facets of those? Such approach fails to amend the inferior and make the good better. Figuratively speaking it makes the strong stronger, the weak weaker, the frank franker, and the cunning and deceitful more cunning and deceitful. Is this really the mission of the UN?

It has to be added that the above mentioned situation is not limited only to the UN PD. Such an indifferent attitude towards the *reliability* of the used data is characteristic to many other “electronic databases”,

as well as international and other organizations involved in compiling various “ratings” [42].

Since there is little hope that the importance of these matters will be realized by the UN PD experts in a reasonably short period of time, we undertook here to correct the situation with the case of Azerbaijani Republic. For this purpose, first of all the above reviewed distortions of official Baku related to the actual migration in the AR prior to 2012, actual population growth rate and actual sex and age distribution of the population were accounted for. Also, the bizarre assumptions of the UN PD regarding migration flows of South Caucasus republics for the period of 2012-2100 were revised.

The results are presented in *Figure 15* (see the red curves). The corrected results suggest that by 2020 the actual *de facto* population of the AR will comprise about 7.6-8.03 million people. By 2100, the AR population will constitute 12 million in the “high” growth scenario (denoted as “AR, corrected high” in *Figure 15*), 7 million in the “medium” variant and 3.5 million in the “low” variant (denoted as “AR, corr. medium” and “AR, corrected low” respectively, in *Figure 15*). The corrections also lead to a characteristic breakpoint at around 1990-95, which corresponds to similar curves for almost all post-Soviet countries.

One more observation to conclude: for long-term forecasts of a country’s population applying primitive, linear models is unacceptable. This is what has been learned from the world experience of complex system modeling since the first studies by the Club of Rome. The internal socio-economic tensions, external impacts, various non-linear effects and the

so called “wild cards” and “phase transitions” have to be absolutely taken into consideration. Recently the world witnessed a number of such “phase transitions”¹. Most likely, more such examples will be seen in the future². However, considering all of the above said, it appears that such issues are completely beyond the scope of the experts who created the mentioned UN PD online database (see more details on this in [42])³.

¹ It is ironic to see the sleek and nice population curves for Sudan in the UN PD database that reach 2100. In fact, Sudan has undergone a “phase transition” and no longer exists. It has broken up in two pieces that are deep in conflict and “chaos”.

² As David Ruelle, one of the “godfathers” of modern dynamical chaos theory often stated, one should never do a forecast standing at a bifurcation point.

³ Our corrections of the UN PD forecasts of the AR population till 2100 are not aimed at shadowing the issue of current demographic situation in Armenia. On the contrary, we believe these issues are urgent, but require deep, somber and comprehensive study, mostly focused on developing complex measures to overcome the existing negative trends.

Chapter 5

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION

The AR census official data on ethnic composition of the population are posted in sections 1.5 and 1.6 of the ASSC corresponding webpage. *Table 6* below summarizes these data, which are quite surprising.

First, official data on the number of Armenians are astonishing – 120 thousand in 2009. Never mind that they simply replicate the 1999 data of the Nagorno-Karabakh census¹. What astounds, is that according to ASSC, out of this number of Armenians only 0.2% were fluent in Azerbaijani, only 0.1% in Russian and 0.0% in English. At the same time, in 2009, 79.5% of Georgians living in Azerbaijan were fluent in Azerbaijani language, 21.4% in Russian and 0.5% in English. This could have been regarded funny, had some very sad realities not been hidden underneath it.

¹ See [23] for demographic indices of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Table 6. Ethnic composition of the Azerbaijani Republic's population according to the results of the 2009 census						
Ethnic origins	Number (in thousands) and percentage of total population		Language spoken fluently by population, percent			
			by own national language [sic]	Azerbaijani	Russian	English
TOTAL	8,922.4	100%	98.8	98.6	7.6	0.8
<i>Azerbaijanians</i> [sic]	8,172.8	91.60%	99.9	-	6.7	0.8
<i>Lezgi</i>	180.3	2.02%	91.7	96.3	23.7	0.7
<i>Russians</i>	119.3	1.34%	99.2	42.9	-	0.9
<i>Armenians</i>	120.3	1.35%	99.9	0.2	0.1	0.0
<i>Talish</i>	112.0	1.26%	43.0	99.8	5.9	0.2
<i>Avars</i>	49.8	0.56%	94.1	99.4	18.1	0.2
<i>Turkish</i>	38.0	0.43%	85.5	99.7	11.0	0.6
<i>Tatarian</i>	25.9	0.29%	93.6	22.7	12.1	0.5
<i>Tats</i>	25.2	0.28%	76.5	99.8	9.0	0.2
<i>Ukrainians</i>	21.5	0.24%	97.7	5.6	3.7	0.1
<i>Sakhur</i>	12.3	0.14%	96.2	99.2	9.9	0.2
<i>Georgians</i>	9.9	0.11%	98.0	79.5	21.4	0.5
<i>Jews</i>	9.1	0.10%	94.1	45.6	19.3	0.6
<i>Kurds</i>	6.1	0.07%	51.9	99.9	6.4	0.1
<i>Griz</i>	4.4	0.05%	28.9	100.0	8.5	0.3
<i>Udins</i>	3.8	0.04%	99.3	99.6	60.9	0.6
<i>Khinalig</i>	2.2	0.02%	97.5	99.9	0.9	0.1
<i>Other nationalities</i>	9.5	0.11%	82.9	62.4	20.0	4.3

Source: 1.6. Population by native language of use [sic]
http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demographic/en/AP/AP_1.shtml

For instance, according to the official data of ASSC, 731.6 thousand Azerbaijanis and Kurds live in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as 120 thousand Armenians [18]. Furthermore, these 731.6 thousand Azerbaijanis and Kurds allegedly living in Nagorno-Karabakh are accounted for *twice*: first, as population of the given territory, and second, as “internally displaced people”, painstakingly documenting their number in the relevant


reports of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)¹. Confused by own falsifications, the ASSC records a 42% (or 70.3 thousand people) growth among the Azerbaijani and Kurdish population of the former Jebrail district for the period of 1990-1999. For Karvatchar, a 75% population growth is claimed during 2000-2005, which even reaches a 2.7-fold increase for the period between 2000 and 2009. In fact, as it is well-known to all interested parties, there is no Azerbaijani or Kurdish population in these districts since mid-1990s.

Absurdity of this situation is realized to some extent even by some Azerbaijani analysts. As one of the Azeri experts has noted; “Since the beginning of the Karabakh conflict and bloodsheds that followed, the number of Armenians in Azerbaijan sharply decreased and currently they live mostly in Nagorno-Karabakh. Actually, the Azerbaijani authorities had been reporting for a while that some 30-40 thousand Armenians live outside Nagorno-Karabakh. So what did the 1999 census show? It turns out that presently 120.7 thousand Armenians live in Azerbaijan! However, a thorough study of the census data by regions reveals that virtually all of these Armenians live in Nagorno-Karabakh... The tragedy of the census data on Armenians is that on the one hand, it is indicated that 35.5 thousand or 29.4% of the Armenians are children aged under 14 years, and on the other hand, it is reported that the average age of Armenians in the country is 57!” [4].

¹ <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d1e6>

There is another surprising aspect in the statistics of official Baku. As shown in *Table 6*, the official estimate of Talysh population in the AR as per the April 2009 census is 112,000 or about 1.3% of the total population. However, according to some conservative estimates, by 1996 the number Talysh people in the AR already comprised about 0.8-1.0 million [24]. With the cautious estimate of Talysh population, i.e. 0.8 million in 1996, and with the official data on average annual population rate of increase for the country it could be estimated that the number of Talysh population in 2011 was 1.04 million, i.e. 11% of the official total population number for the AR, or else, about 12.4% as the US CIA estimates for the same year [26]. As seen, these estimates 10 times exceed the official data. It has to be noted that according to some independent experts the current number of Talysh people in the AR is even higher and they comprise about 20-25% of the total population [25].


In order to clearly realize the practices of official Baku concerning statistical data on ethnic composition of the country's population and characteristics of national policies carried out by the AR and Azerbaijani SSR, it has to be noted that such ethnic groups as Tats, Ossetians, Assyrians, Jeks, Romani, Laks, Yazidi, Mari and others disappeared from Baku's official statistic data for a long period after 1926. As for Talysh, Kurd, Khinalug, Armenian, Udi, Russian, Jewish and other peoples, the fluctuations of their demographics are quite expressive even well before the collapse of the USSR and beginning of the regional conflict [26, 36].



Source: [29]

For instance, according to the data of “the most democratic and well-prepared census organized and led by statistician scientists O.A. Kvitkin, V.G. Mikhaylovski and others” [27, 28] conducted in the USSR on December 17, 1926, the population of the Azerbaijani SSR was composed of 93 nationalities and ethnic groups (see *Figure 17*). As it is well known, the titular nations of the Azerbaijani SSR (at the time part of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic) were the Caucasian Tatars (“Turkic”) and Armenians. According to the 1926 census results, the “Tur-


“Azerbaijani” comprised 63.3% of the Azerbaijani SSR total population (1.185 million people [29, том 14, с. 11-13])¹. The official website for the April 2009 census of the Azerbaijani Republic lists only 17 nationalities and ethnic groups, among which the number of Azerbaijanis is already 8.17 million, i.e. 91.6% of the total population (See *Table 6* and *Figure 18*).



Source: http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demographic/en/AP/AP_1.shtml

¹ Naturally, the term “Azerbaijani” is not used in the 1926 census reports. Parenthetically, it has to be mentioned that the 1926 census differentiated “Georgians” from “Adjarians”, “Mingrelians”, “Laz”, “Svans” and “Abkhazians” (numbered 105-110 in the list of ethnicities [29]). The “Hemshins” were listed under “Armenians”, and followed them in the list (numbers 147-148 in the list).

The policies of forced assimilation (or “Turkification”) of the country’s population and statistical misrepresentations on the “national question” are most evident when the official data of all population censuses in Azerbaijani SSR and Azerbaijani Republic since 1926 are presented in a single chart as in *Figure 19*. The Figure summarizes data of all official censuses in USSR and those of the AR 1999 and 2009 censuses.



Sources: [26, 29-34]

As it can be told from *Figure 19*, during the whole post-WWII period the number of “Azerbaijanis” in the population of Azerbaijani SSR had been consistently and unswervingly increased. According to the 1959 official data it constituted 67% of the total population, whereas by the end of the USSR’s existence in 1989, the census data already report 89% share of the “Azerbaijanis”. In the same period the proportion of the Armenian population declined two-fold from 12% in 1959 to 6% in 1989.

Understandably, the “Armenian segment” of Azerbaijani SSR and Azerbaijani Republic was not the only segment at the expense of which “Turkification” policies of the country were carried out for many decades¹. In this aspect the history of official data on Talysh population of Azerbaijani SSR and Azerbaijani Republic is archetypal [26].

Thus, according to the USSR 1926 census data, 77.3 thousand Talysh people lived in Azerbaijani SSR [29, том 14, с. 11-13]. The 1937 census data (that were classified by the personal order of Stalin [27]) suggest that there were 99.2 thousand Talysh people in Azerbaijani SSR. Two years later, as per USSR 1939 census results, the number of Talysh people in Azerbaijani SSR declined to 87.5 thousand [30]. In 1959 just 85 Talyshes (that’s right, exactly 85) lived in Azerbaijani SSR [30]. Talysh people completely disappeared as a component of Azer-

¹ Similar, and in some aspects even more pronounced practices, or more precisely state-sponsored policies of forced assimilation, “Georgianization” and falsification of statistical data on ethnic composition can be unfortunately observed also in Georgia, during the periods of its all consecutive republics.

baijani SSR population according to the results of the 1970 and 1979 censuses [32, 33]. Then they “suddenly” reappeared during the Gorbachev “Glasnost” period at the end of the Soviet era, in the 1989 census data for Azerbaijani SSR (21.2 thousand people) [34]. And finally in 2009, as already mentioned, the official number of Talysh people living in the AR was 112,000, i.e. slightly higher than that in 1937.

As per data of the 1926 USSR census 28,000 Tats lived in Azerbaijan SSR. The official number for Tats of Azerbaijan SSR 13 years later equaled to zero [30]. Tats appear again in the official data of 1959 census (5.8 thousand) [31]. In 1989-1999 their number remains almost the same at around 10 thousand. And only according to the 2009 census the number of Tats reaches 25.2 thousand.

The fate of Shahdagh peoples (Jeks, Budughis, Haputis, Khinalugis, Krythis) is the same. As the Peoples of the World Encyclopedia correctly notes, “The number of Shahdagh peoples can be estimated only approximately, because the Azerbaijani official authorities consider and register them as “Azerbaijanis” [35]. Overall, *Figure 19* is a depressing evidence and intimidating reminder of a planned destruction of ethnographic, linguistic and cultural diversity in a whole country.

Almost a century-old government policies of forced “Turkification” and “Azerbaijanization” by political leaderships of Azerbaijani SSR and AR persist also today, from the highest authority levels to the grassroots (see for example [36]).

Already in 2000, enthralled with the magic of the big numbers, the former AR President A. Elchibey made a statement that “It is time that 40

million Azeri Turks and 70 million Anatolian Turks unite to create a powerful country with population of 110 million, a regional giant that the whole world will have to reckon with ([37], as quoted in [36, c. 8]). Being fascinated by the ease of simple arithmetic, in his statement Mr. Elchibey casually “Turkified” not only the *whole* population of Azerbaijan, i.e. all 93 nationalities and ethnic groups living in the country already by 1926 and thereafter, but also the motley ethnic multitude of the peoples in northern Iran who have little in common with the “Turks” of Mr. Elchibey. Note that he also called “Turks” the *whole* population of Turkey, which was perhaps a bold, but ill-advised and unrealistic thing to state.

However, such a bizarre and primitive “demographic calculus” is just one facet of the issue. The geopolitical ramification of this “calculus” may turn a much more dangerous thing, as it contains a direct, clear and serious threat to Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and other countries of the region. As to why this “demographic calculus” comes into being and penetrates the real geopolitics of our region, the answer could be found in the poster/map used during the official opening ceremony of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline in 2006 (see *Figure 20*). Take notice of how the Azerbaijani Republic is depicted on the map. Ignoring the regional geographical and political realities, it cuts Armenia from Iran and connects AR directly with Nakhichevan and Turkey. On this map deformed and diminished Republic of Armenia looks quite isolated and “doomed”, while Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Republics of Abkhazia and Ossetia are even less lucky. This is the true geopolitical implication of the “demographic calculus” of the for-



Figure 20: Official launching ceremony of the BTC pipeline in 2006

mer and current presidents of the AR, as materialized in the picture of a regional energy transit infrastructure [38].

This kind of “demographic calculus” has another dimension, too. The cited statement by ex-president of Azerbaijan quite accurately reflects certain sentiments among the current governing elite of the AR. Recently, through efforts of Prof. N. Jafarov, Chairman of the Committee on Cultural Issues of the AR *Milli Majlis* (parliament), the Azeri authorities have been actively discussing a program for mass and forcible change of last

names of the AR citizens [39]. In an interview to *1news.az* news agency this professor (unfortunately, quotation marks may not be applied in this case) stated that: “Anybody, who considers themselves real Azerbaijani, should change their last names.” In the professor’s opinion, not only the obviously non-Azeri last names like those with “-shvili” and “-yan” endings, but also last names with “-ov” and “-ev” suffixes are no longer acceptable for a true Azerbaijani. The stale stink of nationalistic atmosphere reigning in Azerbaijan is well described by the circumstance that according to the same source, Prof. N. Jafarov’s Milli Majlis colleagues were slightly embarrassed by his most radical statements and somewhat reproached the professor who got carried away. However, they generally shared his approach, although **only in relation to the newborns and juveniles!** As any government bureaucrat would twig right away, this is about issuing birth certificates and passports. Here is a case when the “mild” disapproval is even more immoral, unacceptable and obnoxious than Prof. N. Jafarov’s vicious proposal itself.

Therefore, it is no wonder that having faced such realities the NGOs and leaders of the indigenous peoples of the Azerbaijan issued a declaration [40] on December 10, 2011 condemning the forced “Azerbaijanization” policies of official Baku, the Armenophobic and xenophobic atmosphere imposed on the Azerbaijani society by the governing elite of the AR and the warlike rhetoric of official Baku directed towards Armenia.

This declaration received high publicity in the Azerbaijani society, but the official response was strange at least. In this regard Paul Goble (known as author of extravagant projects on resolution of the Karabakh

conflict) wrote a short article in the December 2011 issue of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy Newsletter, where instead of condemning the atmosphere of ethnicity-based xenophobia in the Azerbaijani society and government policies of discrimination against indigenous peoples of the AR, he condemns (sure enough) Armenians for allegedly “playing the Talysh card” in their own interests [41].

It is pity though that in this article Mr. Goble missed the opportunity to analyze the effects of discriminatory government policies against ethnic minorities for the AR, in general, and to duly assess the activities of the AR Milli Majlis member Prof. N. Jafarov and myriads of his predecessors and successors, in particular.

In order to facilitate the comprehension of the mentioned facts and help realize the scale of the effects stemming from official Baku’s state policies of forcible “Turkification” and “Azerbaijanization” of the country’s population, the following has to be noted in conclusion.

As it follows from the *official* data of the AR 1999 census, total population of the republic comprised 7.953 million, which is higher by 932,200 compared to that of the 1989 census. At the same time, according to the 1999 AR census data, ethnic Azerbaijanis constituted 7.205 million people, which exceeds already by 1.4 million the number of ethnic Azerbaijanis among the republic’s total population as per results of the 1989 census [43]. Hence the increase of the ethnic Azerbaijani population exceeds the increase of the country’s total population by 0.5 million (more precisely 468,300). It should be emphasized that these are the *official* data of the AR population censuses.

Such an extraordinary situation calls for explanations. It is impossible that the total height of your body grows by 10 cm, but at the same time your head grows by 11 cm. Or rather, it is possible if say, your feet simultaneously shrink by 1 cm. Similarly, such a sizable growth of ethnic Azerbaijani (Turkic) segment of the AR population is possible only at the expense of the diminishing non-Azerbaijani population segment of the country.

There were attempts by some Azeri authors to explain such demographics by influx of ethnic Azerbaijanis from Armenia and outflow of the non-Azerbaijani population segments from the republic in early 1990s. However, these attempts are not convincing at all, at least because the influx of ethnic Azerbaijanis from Armenia roughly compensated outflow of ethnic Armenians from Azerbaijan, whereas the outflow of other non-Azerbaijani population segments cannot explain for such a large difference [43]. This is not to mention that the inflow of Azerbaijanis is accounted for *twice*; as “population of Karabakh”, and as “refugees” and “internally displaced persons” (see hereinabove). However, we shall not embark here on detailed analysis of the refugees balance and peculiarities of statistics from official Baku and UNHCR.

Conversely, it appears that the previous Chapters clearly point to the source and character of ethnic Azerbaijani population increase exceeding the increase of the country’s total population by 0.5 million in the period between 1989 and 1999. Namely, these are the very 0.5 million people whose sudden “emergence” is recorded by the UN PD Demographic Yearbooks for 1998-2001 (see *Table 2* and further). These are the very

0.5 million persons (more precisely 473,000) by which the female population of the republic increased in two rounds of about 236,000 each, as a result of simple manipulations with statistical data on the AR population distribution by sex (see *Figure 12* and further).

For an ultimate clarity in this issue, it has to be noted that such “oddity” in the results of the 1989 and 1999 censuses is by no means the only one in the history of Azerbaijani Republic or Azerbaijani SSR [43], “rich” with all sorts of “peculiarities”.

However, let us first introduce the concept of “Potential of Forced Assimilation” (PFA) for a given country. This implies a positive difference between the increase of the “titular” nation population and increase of total population of a given country for a time interval between two censuses, calculated exclusively based on the official data. In other words, PFA equals to excess of the growth rate of the titular nation over that of the total population, at the expense of other population segments of a given country.

The official data of all 8 censuses in Azerbaijani SSR and Azerbaijani Republic from the 1926 census to the last AR census in 2009 were tallied in a single table in these terms¹. Based on these data a table was compiled for differences between pairs of consecutive censuses in total population of Azerbaijani SSR/AR with a separate line for its Turkic/Azerbaijani segment alone (see *Table 7*). As it follows from *Table 7*, at least in four intervals between population censuses (1939-59, 1970-

¹ See Annex 4 for more details. Some data of the 1937 census were included there as well.

Table 7. Differences between official censuses data of Azerbaijani SSR and Azerbaijani Republic in the period of 1926-2009. Data of the 1937 census are skipped.							
	1926-39	1939-59	1959-70	1970-79	1979-89	1989-99	1999-09
Total population	935,042	492,567	1,419,364	909,434	994,663	932,200	969,000
Turkic/Azerbaijani	432,494	623,910	1,282,397	932,054	1,096,148	1,400,500	967,300
Potential of Forced Assimilation	-502,548	131,343	-136,967	22,620	101,485	468,300	-1,700

Sources: [26, 29-34, 43].

79, 1979-89, 1989-99)¹ the growth of Turkic/Azerbaijani population surpassed that of the total population of Azerbaijani SSR/AR. The non-Turkic (non-Azerbaijani) segment of the country's population had developed only in the periods 1926-39² and 1959-70. *Figure 21* demonstrates this visually.


Thus, the regional standoff in early 1990s and the related migration flows by no means explain the Potential of Forced Assimilation in Azerbaijan existing well before it. It must to be clearly realized that discrimination of the ethnic minorities, oppression of indigenous peoples and policies of forced assimilation are laid in the very foundation of this state, i.e. these are immanent properties thereof. The PFA of Azerbaijani SSR/AR for the period between 1939 and 1999 equals to 723,750.

¹ Analysis of the 1937 census "classified" data is even more indicative in this sense; however it is not possible to review this here in more detail.

² In reality, only until 1936. After adopting the new constitution of Azerbaijani SSR the repressions against ethnic minorities gained a renewed momentum and the forcible assimilation policies peaked in the decades prior to, during and after the WWII (see more details for example in [36, 43]).

It seems there is every reason to talk about an ethnocide carried out in Azerbaijani SSR/AR during many decades, i.e. over almost the whole period of its short history.

Figure 21. Differences between the increase of ethnic Turkic/ Azerbaijani population and that of the total population in Az.SRR/AR according to the official censuses data (in thousands)



CONCLUSIONS

It can be safely stated that the April 2009 census of the Azerbaijani Republic did not enhance the situation with the statistical data on the population, in contrast to what happened in 2001-2003 in the Republic of Armenia.

Official sources of the Azerbaijani Republic continue to fail differentiating between *de facto* and *de jure* populations, consistently distort the patterns of migration flows and mortality/fertility statistics. The official population size of the Azerbaijani Republic exceeds the actual population number by 2.0-2.2 million. In 2011 it comprised 7 million ($\pm 250,000$ people), rather than 9.11 million.

Since 1996-1997 the official statistics on annual population growth rate in Azerbaijan is distorted toward artificial increase. Data on the AR population distribution by sex are also blatantly garbled.

In line with the traditions of the Soviet Azerbaijan, for many decades and up till now official Baku consistently misrepresents the data

on ethnic composition of the population. The Potential of Forced Assimilation for Azerbaijani SSR/AR in the period between 1939 and 1999 equals to 723,750, which can be characterized as an ethnocide carried out in Azerbaijani SSR/AR during almost the whole period of the republic's short history.

Manipulations of official Baku related to demographic statistics in some cases are replicated by certain international organizations. In case of the UN PD, these manipulations are in a way “validated” in the UN Demographic Yearbooks and widely distributed through electronic and other mass media. Such practice not only contradicts the mission of the United Nations, but also does not contribute to establishing peace in the region.

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ANNEX 1

MIGRANTS AND REMITTANCES

1.1. Number of migrants* from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia in different countries of the world by the end of 2010. According to the WB DPG Factbook 2011

Sorted by number of emigrants from Azerbaijan		Source country			Three republics of South Caucasus	
		Azerbaijan	Georgia	Armenia		
Destination country	1	Russian Federation	866,843	644,390	493,126	2,004,359
	2	Armenia	164,483	75,792		240,275
	3	<i>Other South**</i>	145,784	98,123	76,329	320,236
	4	Ukraine	92,536	72,410	53,193	218,138
	5	Kazakhstan	38,921	2,635	7,357	48,912
	6	Israel	35,101	26,032	16,509	77,643
	7	Germany	23,265	18,164	15,515	56,944
	8	Turkey	18,807	7,295	891	26,993
	9	USA	9,689	25,310	77,208	112,206
	10	Turkmenistan	7,895	0	7,248	15,142
	11	Georgia	7,819		17,769	25,589
	12	Latvia	5,212	3,845	3,164	12,221
	13	Belarus	3,792	1,807	6,074	11,672
	14	Netherland	2,821	941	1,912	5,674
	15	Canada	2,631	1,781	2,555	6,967
	16	Iran	2,155	0	1,375	3,530
	17	Lithuania	849	568	431	1,847
	18	UK	751	738	789	2,278
	19	Spain	569	10,702	12,388	23,658
	20	Sweden	541	385	888	1,814
	21	Poland	358	465	1,941	2,764
	22	France	350	1,156	14,481	15,987
	23	Australia	315	420	1,156	1 892
	24	Italy	254	1,316	554	2,124
	25	Norway	221	141	167	529
	26	Austria	196	659	589	1,444
	27	Denmark	188	158	744	1,089
	28	Czech Rep.	186	362	931	1,479
	29	Greece	156	41,817	8,769	50,742
	30	Switzerland	152	373	474	998
	31	Ireland	112	366	135	613
	32	Belgium	111	416	1,153	1,680
	33	Argentine	99	74	46	219

Sorted by number of emigrants from Azerbaijan		Source country			Three republics of South Caucasus
		Azerbaijan	Georgia	Armenia	
34	Finland	69	74	148	290
35	New Zealand	59	89	36	184
36	Japan	48	49	32	128
37	Slovakia	39	73	164	276
38	Cyprus	33	13,497	1,037	14,568
39	Congo, Rep.	24	18	12	54
40	Mexico	22	138	76	237
41	Hungary	19	78	75	173
42	Portugal	16	199	78	292
43	Luxembourg	5	14	7	26
44	Cambodia	5	2	2	9
45	Bolivia	3	0	2	5
46	Ecuador	3	0	53	56
47	Peru	3	0	1	4
48	Mauritania	2	2	2	6
49	Panama	1	1	6	9
50	Uruguay	1	1	215	217
51	Azerbaijan		5,258	42,596	47,854
52	Belize		14	0	14
53	Chile		3	17	21
54	Dominican Rep.		18	9	27
55	Venezuela		3	28	31
Total		1,433,513	1,058,300	870,458	3,362,271

** Includes only migrants who were recorded to have made remittances through the banking system.*

*** Other countries in southern hemisphere not listed in the table.*

1.2. Number of migrants* from different countries of the world in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia by the end of 2010. According to the WB DPG Factbook 2011

Sorted by number of immigrants in Azerbaijan		Destination country			Three republics of South Caucasus	
		Azerbaijan	Georgia	Armenia		
Source country	1	<i>Other South**</i>	155,844	3,871	6,145	165,860
	2	Russian Federation	50,007	109,968	32,993	192,968
	3	Armenia	42,596	17,769		60,365
	4	Ukraine	10,234	7,447	4,873	22,555
	5	Georgia	5,258		75,792	81,050
	6	Azerbaijan		7,819	164,483	172,303
	7	Belarus		310		310
	8	Bulgaria		1,200		1,200
	9	China		600		600
	10	Estonia		41		41
	11	Germany		1,676	1,241	2,917
	12	Greece		1,365	3,360	4,725
	13	India		434		434
	14	Iran		455	18,154	18,609
	15	Israel		972		972
	16	Italy		331		331
	17	Kazakhstan		455	1,480	1,935
	18	Kyrgyzstan		145		145
	19	Latvia		62		62
	20	Lebanon			2,123	2,123
	21	Lithuania		83		83
	22	Moldova		124		124
	23	Nepal		393		393
	24	Pakistan		1,655		1,655
	25	Romania		476		476
	26	Syria			6,065	6,065
	27	Tajikistan		207		207
	28	Turkey		6,206	3,679	9,885
	29	Turkmenistan		145	1,543	1,688
	30	UK		538		538
	31	USA		1,593		1,593
	32	Uzbekistan		765	2,163	2,928
	33	<i>Other North***</i>		163	90	253
Total		263,940	167,269	324,184	755,393	

* Includes only migrants who were recorded to have made remittances through the banking system.

** Other countries in southern hemisphere not listed in the table.

*** Other countries in northern hemisphere not listed in the table.

1.3. Remittances from different countries of the world to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia by the end of 2010 (in US\$ million at purchasing power parity)
According to the WB DPG Factbook 2011

Sorted by remittances to Azerbaijan		Remittance-receiving country			Total for the three republics of South Caucasus	
		Azerbaijan	Georgia	Armenia		
Remittance-sending country	1	Russian Federation	898.7	490.6	436.5	1,825.7
	2	Armenia	154.7	45.9		200.6
	3	<i>Other South**</i>	137.1	58.0	53.8	248.9
	4	Ukraine	87.0	43.4	37.5	167.9
	5	Israel	45.4	27.7	20.1	93.1
	6	Kazakhstan	39.1	1.9	6.2	47.2
	7	Germany	33.8	22.8	22.1	78.7
	8	Turkey	19.5	5.6	0.8	25.9
	9	USA	14.6	33.5	116.0	164.2
	10	Turkmenistan	7.4		5.3	12.8
	11	Georgia	7.4		12.5	19.9
	12	Latvia	5.7	3.1	3.0	11.8
	13	Netherland	4.3	1.3	2.9	8.5
	14	Canada	3.8	2.2	3.6	9.6
	15	Belarus	3.6	1.2	4.8	9.7
	16	Iran	2.0		1.1	3.1
	17	UK	1.05	0.87	1.06	2.98
	18	Lebanon	0.92	0.46	0.40	1.78
	19	Sweden	0.80	0.50	1.31	2.61
	20	Spain	0.77	12.15	16.05	28.97
	21	France	0.51	1.48	21.03	23.03
	22	Australia	0.47	0.55	1.73	2.75
	23	Norway	0.40	0.24	0.32	0.96
	24	Poland	0.39	0.38	1.83	2.59
	25	Italy	0.35	1.56	0.75	2.66
	26	Denmark	0.30	0.23	1.21	1.74
	27	Austria	0.30	0.87	0.88	2.05
	28	Switzerland	0.26	0.59	0.84	1.69
	29	Czech Rep.	0.22	0.34	1.00	1.56
	30	Greece	0.21	46.13	11.05	57.39
	31	Ireland	0.18	0.51	0.21	0.89
	32	Belgium	0.16	0.54	1.69	2.39
	33	Finland	0.10	0.10	0.22	0.42
	34	Argentina	0.10	0.05	0.04	0.20
	35	New Zealand	0.08	0.09	0.04	0.22

Sorted by remittances to Azerbaijan		Remittance-receiving country			Total for the three republics of South Caucasus
		Azerbaijan	Georgia	Armenia	
36	Japan	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.17
37	Slovakia	0.05	0.07	0.17	0.28
38	Cyprus	0.04	14.89	1.31	16.24
39	Mexico	0.023	0.104	0.066	0.193
40	Congo, Rep.	0.023	0.011	0.008	0.042
41	Hungary	0.021	0.066	0.073	0.160
42	Portugal	0.019	0.195	0.087	0.302
43	Luxembourg	0.010	0.028	0.016	0.054
44	Cambodia	0.004	0.001	0.002	0.007
45	Bolivia	0.003		0.001	0.004
46	Ecuador	0.003		0.040	0.044
47	Peru	0.003		0.001	0.003
48	Mauritania	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.004
49	Panama	0.001	0.001	0.005	0.008
50	Uruguay	0.001	0.001	0.194	0.195
51	Sri Lanka	0.001	0.000		0.001
52	Azerbaijan		3.54	33.55	37.09
53	Belize		0.009		0.009
54	Brazil		0.097		0.097
55	Chile		0.003	0.015	0.018
56	Dominican Rep.		0.012	0.007	0.020
57	Venezuela		0.002	0.026	0.029
Total for 2010		1,472.00	824.00	824.00	2,296.00

Note: Under the WB DPG methodology remittances from Armenia to Artsakh and vice versa are viewed as remittances from Armenia to Azerbaijan and vice versa.

*** Other countries in southern hemisphere not listed in the table.*

1.4. Remittances from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia to different countries of the world by the end of 2010 (in US\$ million at purchasing power parity)
According to the WB DPG Factbook 2011

Sorted by remittances from Azerbaijan		Remittance-sending country			Total received from all countries in 2010	Total received from the three republics of South Caucasus in 2010	
		Azerbaijan	Georgia	Armenia			
Remittance-receiving country	1	Armenia	33.547	12.518		824	46.065
	2	Russian Federation	24.268	53.367	16.011	5,590	93.646
	3	Ukraine	6.769	4.362	2.897	5,289	14.027
	4	Georgia	3.541		45.878	824	49.419
	5	Azerbaijan		7.353	154.681	1,472	162.034
	6	China		2.333		51,000	2.333
	7	Germany		5.434	4.026	11,559	9.460
	8	Greece		2.304	5.671	2,107	7.975
	9	India		0.959		55,000	0.959
	10	Iran		0.263	10.472	1,141	10.735
	11	Israel		1.295		1,379	1.295
	12	Italy		0.316		3,393	0.316
	13	Lebanon			21.218	8,177	21.218
	14	Lithuania		0.211		1,210	0.211
	15	Nepal		0.881		3,513	0.881
	16	Pakistan		1.716		9,407	1.716
	17	Romania		0.612		4,517	0.612
	18	Syria			6.279	1,407	6.279
	19	Turkey		1.094	0.648	950	1.742
Total for 2010		68.00	95.00	268.00	168,759.00	430.923	

Note: Under the WB DPG methodology remittances from Armenia to Artsakh and vice versa are viewed as remittances from Armenia to Azerbaijan and vice versa.

ANNEX 2

Population Distribution by Sex in the Azerbaijani Republic
(in millions) ASSC data*
http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demographic/en/AP_/AP_1.shtml

Year	Total	<i>of which</i>		<i>as % of total population</i>		Females per 1000 males
		Male	Female	Male	Female	
1926	2.3137	1.2124	1.1013	52.4	47.6	908.4
1939	3.2052	1.6426	1.5626	51.2	48.8	951.3
1959	3.6977	1.7566	1.9411	47.5	52.5	1105.0
1960	3.8157	1.8170	1.9987	47.6	52.4	1100.0
1961	3.9733	1.9015	2.0718	47.9	52.1	1089.6
1962	4.1182	1.9748	2.1434	48.0	52.0	1085.4
1963	4.2181	2.0290	2.1891	48.1	51.9	1078.9
1964	4.3690	2.1081	2.2609	48.3	51.7	1072.5
1965	4.5095	2.1758	2.3337	48.2	51.8	1072.6
1966	4.6398	2.2433	2.3965	48.3	51.7	1068.3
1967	4.7765	2.3142	2.4623	48.4	51.6	1064.0
1968	4.8875	2.3680	2.5195	48.5	51.5	1064.0
1969	5.0095	2.4296	2.5799	48.5	51.5	1061.9
1970	5.1171	2.4830	2.6341	48.5	51.5	1060.9
1971	5.2270	2.5391	2.6879	48.6	51.4	1058.6
1972	5.3389	2.5991	2.7398	48.7	51.3	1054.1
1973	5.4440	2.6543	2.7897	48.8	51.2	1051.0
1974	5.5438	2.7061	2.8377	48.8	51.2	1048.6
1975	5.6444	2.7571	2.8873	48.8	51.2	1047.2
1976	5.7337	2.8020	2.9317	48.9	51.1	1046.3
1977	5.8283	2.8458	2.9825	48.8	51.2	1048.0
1978	5.9240	2.8871	3.0369	48.7	51.3	1051.9
1979	6.0283	2.9388	3.0895	48.8	51.2	1051.3
1980	6.1143	2.9815	3.1328	48.8	51.2	1050.7
1981	6.2067	3.0263	3.1804	48.8	51.2	1050.9
1982	6.3088	3.0769	3.2319	48.8	51.2	1050.4
1983	6.4063	3.1247	3.2816	48.8	51.2	1050.2
1984	6.5133	3.1769	3.3364	48.8	51.2	1050.2
1985	6.6224	3.2290	3.3934	48.8	51.2	1050.9
1986	6.7179	3.2743	3.4436	48.7	51.3	1051.7
1987	6.8227	3.3254	3.4973	48.7	51.3	1051.7
1988	6.9280	3.3784	3.5496	48.8	51.2	1050.7
1989	7.0212	3.4238	3.5974	48.8	51.2	1050.7
1990	7.1319	3.4817	3.6502	48.8	51.2	1048.4
1991	7.2185	3.5241	3.6944	48.8	51.2	1048.3
1992	7.3241	3.5792	3.7449	48.9	51.1	1046.3

Year	Total	<i>of which</i>		<i>as % of total population</i>		Females per 1000 males
		Male	Female	Male	Female	
1993	7.4400	3.6412	3.7988	48.9	51.1	1043.3
1994	7.5496	3.7025	3.8471	49.0	51.0	1039.1
1995	7.6435	3.7546	3.8889	49.1	50.9	1035.8
1996	7.7262	3.8027	3.9235	49.2	50.8	1031.8
1997	7.7998	3.8453	3.9545	49.3	50.7	1028.4
1998	7.8767	3.8832	3.9935	49.3	50.7	1028.4
1999	7.9534	3.8831	4.0703	48.8	51.2	1048.2
2000	8.0328	3.9270	4.1058	48.9	51.1	1045.5
2001	8.1143	3.9720	4.1423	49.0	51.0	1042.9
2002	8.1914	4.0150	4.1764	49.0	51.0	1040.2
2003	8.2692	4.0580	4.2112	49.1	50.9	1037.8
2004	8.3491	4.1022	4.2469	49.1	50.9	1035.3
2005	8.4474	4.1562	4.2912	49.2	50.8	1032.5
2006	8.5531	4.2135	4.3396	49.3	50.7	1029.9
2007	8.6661	4.2749	4.3912	49.3	50.7	1027.2
2008	8.7799	4.3368	4.4431	49.4	50.6	1024.5
2009	8.9224	4.4144	4.5080	49.5	50.5	1021.2
2010	8.9976	4.4555	4.5421	49.5	50.5	1019.4
2011	9.1111	4.5171	4.5940	49.6	50.4	1017.0

* ASSC note. 1926, 1939, 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989, 1999, 2009 – by population census conditions [sic], data of rest years to the beginning of the year [sic].

Last visited September 2011

ANNEX 3

Population Growth Scenarios for the Azerbaijani Republic According to the UN PD (in millions)

Year	Population (millions)			
	High growth scenario	Medium growth scenario	Low growth scenario	Constant fertility scenario
1950	2.896	2.896	2.896	2.896
1955	3.326	3.326	3.326	3.326
1960	3.894	3.894	3.894	3.894
1965	4.575	4.575	4.575	4.575
1970	5.172	5.172	5.172	5.172
1975	5.689	5.689	5.689	5.689
1980	6.161	6.161	6.161	6.161
1985	6.670	6.670	6.670	6.670
1990	7.212	7.212	7.212	7.212
1995	7.765	7.765	7.765	7.765
2000	8.111	8.111	8.111	8.111
2005	8.588	8.588	8.588	8.588
2010	9.188	9.188	9.188	9.188
2015	9.853	9.750	9.647	9.753
2020	10.488	10.231	9.973	10.232
2025	10.986	10.563	10.141	10.564
2030	11.386	10.807	10.229	10.819
2035	11.813	11.041	10.281	11.075
2040	12.307	11.274	10.286	11.323
2045	12.815	11.464	10.211	11.519
2050	13.274	11.578	10.047	11.640
2055	13.688	11.633	9.820	11.716
2060	14.121	11.671	9.561	11.789
2065	14.618	11.712	9.277	11.864
2070	15.172	11.747	8.959	11.924
2075	15.752	11.763	8.609	11.966
2080	16.355	11.772	8.251	12.009
2085	17.011	11.801	7.909	12.084
2090	17.743	11.857	7.591	12.190
2095	18.536	11.924	7.281	12.303
2100	19.353	11.976	6.967	12.401

Source: <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/p2k0data.asp>

ANNEX 4

Population Census Results of Azerbaijani SSR and Azerbaijani Republic:
Total Population, Turkic/Azerbaijani and Some of the Other Ethnicities of the Republic's Population

	1926	1937 *	1939	1959	1970	1979	1989	1999	2009
Total	2,270,108	3,056,449	3,205,150	3,697,717	5,117,081	6,026,515	7,021,178	7,953,400	8,922,400
Turkic/Azerbaijani	1,437,977	1,778,798	1,870,471	2,494,381	3,776,778	4,708,832	5,804,980	7,205,500	8,172,800
Non-Turkic /non-Azerbaijani, of which:	832,131	1,277,651	1,334,679	1,203,336	1,340,303	1,317,683	1,216,198	747,900	749,600
Armenian	282,004	370,164	388,025	442,089	483,520	475,486	390,505	120,700	120,300
Russian	220,545	479,008	528,318	501,282	510,059	475,255	392,304	141,700	119,300
Talysh	77,323	99,145	87,510	85	0	0	21,169	76,800	112,000
Kurd	41,193	10,878	6,005	1,487	5,488	5,676	12,226	13,100	6,100
Lezgi	37,263	104,290	111,666	98,211	137,250	158,057	171,395	178,000	180,300
Tat	28,443	56,933	0	5,887	7,769	8,848	10,239	10,900	25,200
Jewish	20,578	0	41,245	40,204	29,392	33,248	25,190	8,900	9,100
Avar	19,104	12,854	15,740	17,254	30,735	35,991	44,072	50,900	49,800
Tsakhur	15,552	0	0	2,876	6,208	8,546	13,318	15,900	12,300
Udi	0	0	0	3,202	5,492	5,841	6,125	4,100	3,800

Sources: [26, 27, 29-34]

* The 1937 census data were classified and withdrawn from circulation (see [27] for more details)

Ara Marjanyan

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